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JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS AS ELEVATING FACTORS IN 
SUBSEQUENT ADULT SENTENCING AND THE STRUCTURAL 
ROLE OF THE JURY 
Andrew Sokol* 
INTRODUCTION 
In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the 
Sixth Amendment1 requires that any fact used to increase a criminal 
sentence beyond its statutory maximum must be “submitted to a jury, 
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”2  The Court carved out one 
narrow but significant exception to this rule:  the fact of a prior con-
viction may be used as a sentence-elevating factor without being 
found by a jury.3  The central question addressed by this Comment is 
whether the elevation of an adult’s sentence on the basis of a prior 
juvenile adjudication is constitutionally permissible under Apprendi.  
My contention is that a satisfactory answer to this question must take 
into account the structural role of the jury.  An analysis premised on 
an understanding of the jury guarantee as an individual right aimed 
at assuring accurate fact-finding is necessarily incomplete.  Once the 
role of the jury guarantee as a fundamental reservation of power in 
our constitutional structure is fully appreciated,4 it becomes clear that 
sentence elevation based on prior juvenile non-jury adjudications 
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would like to thank my family, my professors, and the staff of the Journal. 
 1 The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides in relevant part that “[i]n all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 2 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). 
 3 Id. 
 4 This understanding of the jury right is perhaps most commonly associated with Akhil 
Amar.  See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:  CREATION AND 
RECONSTRUCTION, 81–118 (1998) (describing the Framers’ intent in passing the Sixth 
Amendment as providing a democratic check on the the judiciary).  This idea has been 
more recently developed by Laura Appleman.  See generally Laura I. Appleman, The Lost 
Meaning of the Jury Trial Right, 84 IND. L.J. 397 (2009) (providing extensive historical sup-
port for the notion that the jury right is a community right rather than an individual 
right).  Appreciation of the jury’s structural role is not limited to the scholarly literature, 
but can also be seen throughout a number of U.S. Supreme Court opinions—in particu-
lar, the opinions and dissents of Justice Scalia.  See infra Part III.A. 
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cannot be reconciled with the robust conception of the Sixth 
Amendment articulated in Apprendi and subsequent cases. 
Despite the dubious constitutionality of treating non-jury juvenile 
adjudications as prior convictions for Apprendi purposes, state legisla-
tures and the U.S. Congress have passed recidivism statutes that ena-
ble the use of juvenile adjudications as elevating factors in criminal 
sentencing.5  Most state and federal courts that have addressed the is-
sue have held that the use of juvenile non-jury adjudications to ele-
vate subsequent adult criminal sentences does not violate Apprendi’s 
command.6  Only Louisiana’s Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit 
have taken the opposite position.7  Oregon’s high court has adopted 
 
 5 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), (2) (2006) (defining some juvenile adjudications as quali-
fying convictions for purposes of a provision mandating a minimum fifteen-year sentence 
for illegal possession of a firearm by a defendant with three previous qualifying convic-
tions); CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(d)(3) (West 1999) (treating some juvenile adjudications 
as prior felony convictions for purpose of the state’s three strikes law). 
 6 See, e.g., Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 429 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[B]ecause juvenile 
adjudications are reliable, they are not subject to the Apprendi rule.”); United States v. 
Matthews, 498 F.3d 25, 34–36 (1st Cir. 2007) (finding no distinction between juvenile ad-
judications and adult convictions, but not reaching the question of a right to trial by jury 
since defendant waived this right); United States v. Crowell, 493 F.3d 744, 749–51 (6th 
Cir. 2007) (holding that the use of prior juvenile adjudications to increase sentences does 
not violate due process); United States v. Burge, 407 F.3d 1183, 1187–91 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(upholding lower court’s application of juvenile adjudication to increase sentence); 
United States v. Jones, 332 F.3d 688, 694–96 (3d Cir 2003) (“A prior nonjury juvenile ad-
judication that was afforded all constitutionally-required procedural safeguards can prop-
erly be characterized as prior conviction for Apprendi purposes.”); United States v. Smal-
ley, 294 F.3d 1030, 1031–33 (8th Cir. 2002) (concluding that “juvenile adjudications can 
rightly be characterized as ‘prior convictions’ for Apprendi purposes”); People v. Nguyen, 
209 P.3d 946, 953–55 (Cal. 2009) (“[T]he Apprendi rule does not preclude use of nonjury 
juvenile adjudications to enhance later adult sentences.”); State v. McFee, 721 N.W.2d 
607, 615–19 (Minn. 2006) (“We hold that, in calculating a defendant’s criminal history 
score, a defendant does not have a Sixth Amendment right to a jury determination of the 
fact of a prior juvenile adjudication.”); State v. Weber, 149 P.3d 646, 649–53 (Wash. 2006) 
(finding that the inclusion of defendant’s juvenile adjudications fell within Apprendi’s 
prior conviction exception); People v. Mazzoni, 165 P.3d 719, 722–23 (Colo. App. 2006) 
(finding “no error in the trial court’s aggravating defendant’s sentence on the basis of his 
prior juvenile adjudications”); Ryle v. State, 842 N.E.2d 320, 321–23 (Ind. 2005) (finding 
that juvenile adjudications can be factors in proper sentencing considerations for a trial 
judge and need not be submitted to a jury); State v. Hitt, 42 P.3d 732, 740 (Kan. 2002) 
(“Juvenile adjudications need not  be . . . proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt be-
fore they can be used in calculating a defendant’s criminal history score . . . .”); Nichols v. 
State, 910 So. 2d 863, 864–65 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (declining to hold that “prior ju-
venile dispositions are not valid prior convictions for the exception to sentencing en-
hancements in Apprendi”). 
 7 See United States v. Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187, 1194–95 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Apprendi’s narrow 
‘prior conviction’ exception is limited to prior convictions resulting from proceedings 
that afforded the procedural necessities of a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Thus, the ‘prior conviction’ exception does not include non-jury juvenile adjudi-
cations.”); State v. Brown, 879 So. 2d 1276, 1281–90 (La. 2004) (“Because a juvenile adju-
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a middle position, holding that the absence of a jury right in the 
prior adjudication does not preclude its use as an elevating factor, 
but that a defendant has a right to a jury determination of the fact of 
the prior juvenile adjudication.8 
This Comment argues that the majority position rests on a con-
ception of the jury right that undervalues the structural role of the 
jury intended by the Framers of the Constitution.  My goal is to ex-
amine the practice of enhancing criminal sentences on the basis of 
juvenile priors in light of a more complete and historically accurate 
understanding of the jury trial right.  In the course of this examina-
tion, it will become clear that an underappreciated problem with the 
sentencing practice at issue is obscured by the majority position’s im-
plicit assumption that the jury trial right is exclusively an individual 
right aimed at promoting accuracy.  By giving the jury’s original 
structural purpose its proper place in the analysis, I will show that the 
Sixth Amendment prohibits sentence enhancements based on prior 
juvenile adjudications in which the accused had no right to a jury tri-
al. 
Part I describes the exception that, in the view of most courts, al-
lows the use of juvenile priors as sentence enhancements.  This Part 
then traces the origin of the prior conviction exception in order to 
explain the central constitutional problem with this practice.  Part II 
examines the arguments that courts have used to support the majori-
ty position and the usual responses to these arguments.  Part III dis-
cusses the pervasive mischaracterization of the jury guarantee as a 
right designed only to ensure accuracy.  This Part then lays out the 
support for a conception of the jury right that is not focused exclu-
sively on accuracy, but also appreciates the role of the jury right as an 
institutional allocation of power.  It is then suggested that the argu-
ments supporting the majority position rely on an incomplete under-
standing of the jury right. By basing their analyses on an incomplete 
understanding of the Sixth Amendment, courts have obscured the 
extent to which allowing sentence elevations based upon prior juve-
nile adjudications erodes the jury right as envisioned by the Framers.  
Finally, Part IV discusses and evaluates possible steps the U.S. Su-
preme Court could take to resolve the asserted constitutional dilem-
 
dication is not established through a procedure guaranteeing a jury trial, it cannot be ex-
cepted from Apprendi’s general rule . . . .”). 
 8 See State v. Harris, 118 P.3d 236, 238–46 (Or. 2005) (“It is of no moment—at least for 
Sixth Amendment purposes—if the legislature chooses to designate, inter alia, a prior 
nonjury juvenile adjudication as an element that . . . lengthens a criminal sentence, so 
long as the existence of that prior adjudication is proved to a jury . . . .”). 
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ma, with particular attention paid to consistency with the structural 
role of the jury. 
I.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM WITH SENTENCE ELEVATION ON 
THE BASIS OF PRIOR NON-JURY JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS 
Apprendi forbids the elevation of a criminal sentence beyond a sta-
tutorily prescribed maximum on the basis of facts not proved to a 
jury.9  Recidivism enhancements are permissible only because of the 
prior conviction exception to Apprendi’s rule.10  Under this exception, 
a prior conviction, unlike any other fact, may be used to elevate a 
criminal sentence beyond its statutorily prescribed maximum without 
first having been proved to a jury.11  Whether or not the enhance-
ment of adult sentences based upon juvenile priors is constitutionally 
permissible, therefore, turns on whether juvenile non-jury adjudica-
tions fall within the prior conviction exception to Apprendi’s general 
rule.12 
The exception for prior convictions is premised on the idea that 
because the jury right would have attached (and been either exer-
cised or waived) in the prior trial, there is no need to have another 
jury find that the prior offense had been committed.13  In the case of 
juvenile adjudications, however, a jury trial is not constitutionally 
mandated.14  Indeed, most states do not provide a jury right for de-
fendants in juvenile court.15  The problem with lumping juvenile ad-
judications in with adult criminal convictions, then, is that juvenile 
adjudications lack the very feature that justifies the prior conviction 
exception.  The exception cannot properly be interpreted to include 
juvenile adjudications lacking the essential procedural safeguard that 
distinguishes adult convictions from all other aggravating circums-
tances for Apprendi purposes. 
 
 9 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). 
 10 See supra notes 3, 5 and accompanying text. 
 11 Id. 
 12 If juvenile non-jury adjudications do not fall within the prior conviction exception, there 
can be no doubt that they are impermissible under Apprendi when they raise the defen-
dant’s sentence above the statutorily prescribed maximum. 
 13 See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488 (“[T]he certainty that procedural safeguards attached to any 
‘fact’ of prior conviction . . . mitigated the due process and Sixth Amendment concerns 
otherwise implicated in allowing a judge to determine a ‘fact’ increasing punishment 
beyond the maximum of the statutory range.”). 
 14 See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). 
 15 SAMUEL M. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES § 5:3 (2d ed. 2010). 
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 Understanding the rationale for the prior conviction exception 
requires an examination of two significant pre-Apprendi cases:  Almen-
darez-Torres v. United States16 and Jones v. United States.17  In Almendarez-
Torres, the Supreme Court considered whether a recidivism provision 
constituted an offense element or a sentencing factor.18  Petitioner 
Hugo Almendarez-Torres had been convicted of returning to the 
United States after having been deported.19  This offense ordinarily 
authorizes a sentence of not more than two years,20 but a related pro-
vision authorizes a sentence of up to twenty years if the initial depor-
tation took place “subsequent to a commission of an aggravated felo-
ny.”21  The district court found a sentence range of seventy-seven to 
ninety-six months applicable.22 
At issue on appeal was the question of whether the recidivism pro-
vision defines a separate crime or simply authorizes an enhanced sen-
tence.23  The question arose not from a claim of violation of the de-
fendant’s jury right, but rather from a claim that the sentence was not 
valid because the prior conviction had not been charged in the in-
dictment, which would be required if it were an offense element ra-
ther than merely a sentencing provision.  Placing great emphasis on 
the traditional status of recidivism as a sentencing factor,24 the Court 
held that recidivism was not an element of the crime.25  Consequently, 
the Court held, recidivism need not be stated in the indictment, nor 
must it be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury.26 
Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsberg, 
dissented, concluding that the statute must be read as defining two 
 
 16 523 U.S. 224 (1998). 
 17 526 U.S. 227 (1999). 
 18 Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 226. 
 19 Id. at 227. 
 20 Id. at 226; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2006). 
 21 Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 226 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) (1994)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
 22 Id. at 227. 
 23 Id. at 226.  The question arose not from a claim of violation of the defendant’s jury right, 
but rather from a claim that the sentence was not valid because the prior conviction had 
not been charged in the indictment, which would be required if it were an offense ele-
ment rather than merely a sentencing provision.  Id. at 227–28. 
 24 Id. at 230 (“At the outset, we note that the relevant statutory subject matter is recidivism.  
That subject matter—prior commission of a serious crime—is as typical a sentencing fac-
tor as one might imagine.”). 
 25 Id. at 226–27. 
 26 See id. at 247 (rejecting defendant-petitioner’s claim that the Sixth Amendment requires 
that his recidivism be treated as an offense element and therefore proven to a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt). 
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separate criminal offenses.27  The Court is required to adopt a rea-
sonable interpretation of a statute that avoids a “serious constitution-
al doubt” over an alternative interpretation under which such doubt 
arises.28  The dissent found serious constitutional doubt regarding the 
“difficult question whether the Constitution requires a fact which 
substantially increases the maximum permissible punishment for a 
crime to be treated as an element of that crime—to be charged in the 
indictment, and found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury.”29 
A year after deciding Almendarez-Torres, the Court handed down 
Jones v. United States.30  At issue in Jones was whether the federal car-
jacking statute31 defines three distinct crimes or one crime that has 
three penalties depending on the presence of aggravating factors.32  
In three separate subsections, the provision authorizes three different 
punishments depending on whether the crime resulted in serious 
bodily harm, death, or neither.33  Jones had been convicted by a jury 
of carjacking, but neither the indictment nor the jury instruction on 
the offense elements had contained any reference to serious bodily 
injury.34  Moreover, the magistrate judge told Jones that he faced a 
maximum sentence of fifteen years, the prescribed maximum for car-
jacking not resulting in serious bodily harm or death.35  At sentenc-
ing, however, Jones was given a sentence of twenty-five years on the 
basis of the judge’s finding by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the carjacking of which he had been convicted led to serious bodily 
harm.36  Neither the district court nor the circuit court was persuaded 
by Jones’s argument that serious bodily harm was an offense ele-
ment.37  At stake in the determination of whether the fact of serious 
bodily harm was an element of the offense or merely a sentencing 
factor was whether Jones was entitled to have that fact charged in his 
 
 27 See id. at 248–49 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Illegal reentry simpliciter (§ 1326(a)) and illegal 
reentry after conviction of an aggravated felony (§ 1326(b)(2)) are separate criminal of-
fenses.”). 
 28 Id. at 250. 
 29 Id. at 248. 
 30 526 U.S. 227 (1999) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 2119 establishes three separate offenses by 
the specification of elements, each of which must be charged by indictment, proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt, and submitted to a jury for its verdict). 
 31 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (2006). 
 32 Jones, 526 U.S. at 229. 
 33 Id. at 230. 
 34 Id. at 230–31. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. at 231. 
 37 Id. at 231–32. 
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indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt.38 
The Supreme Court determined, based on a close examination of 
the statutory language and an analysis of congressional intent, that 
the relevant statute is best read to treat serious bodily harm as an 
element of a distinct offense rather than an enhancement.39  Recog-
nizing, however, that the alternative view was plausible,40 the Court 
ultimately supported its construction by appealing to the venerable 
principle that “where a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by 
one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by 
the other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt 
the latter.”41  Undertaking a thorough examination of the relevant 
precedent as well as the history and origin of the Sixth Amendment, 
the Court concluded that “there is reason to suppose that in the 
present circumstances . . . the relative diminution of the jury’s signi-
ficance would merit Sixth Amendment concern.”42  The Court there-
fore resolved the question in exactly the same manner suggested by 
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Almendarez-Torres. 
Having adopted the reasoning of the Almendarez-Torres dissent and 
based its opinion on the existence of significant constitutional doubt 
regarding a practice that the Almendarez-Torres majority had held con-
stitutionally permissible, the Jones Court was in a bind.  The Court 
could either overrule the year-old Almendarez-Torres precedent or ex-
plain why there was no constitutional doubt about classifying recidiv-
ism as a sentencing factor that need not be proven to a jury.  The 
Court distinguished the fact of a prior conviction from other facts 
that increase criminal sentences in two ways.  First, the Court ob-
served that the holding of Almendarez-Torres rested heavily on “the 
tradition of regarding recidivism as a sentencing factor.”43  Second, 
the Court explained the “constitutional distinctiveness” of recidivism 
as follows:  “unlike virtually any other consideration used to enlarge 
the possible penalty for an offense . . . a prior conviction must itself 
have been established through procedures satisfying the fair notice, 
reasonable doubt, and jury trial guarantees.”44  In other words, the rea-
son that prior convictions escape the constitutional doubt that sur-
 
 38 Id. at 232. 
 39 Id. at 232–39. 
 40 Id. at 239. 
 41 Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 
(1909)). 
 42 Id. at 248. 
 43 Id. at 249. 
 44 Id. (emphasis added). 
798 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 13:3 
 
rounds all other sentence-elevating facts is that the facts underpin-
ning a prior conviction have already been charged in an indictment 
and, barring guilty pleas and waivers of the jury right, found to be 
true beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury. 
Neither the Almendarez-Torres dissent nor the Jones majority had, of 
course, actually held unconstitutional the practice of circumventing 
juries by defining certain facts as sentencing factors rather than of-
fense elements.45  Neither opinion reached this question.  Rather, 
both opinions merely suggested that there was sufficient constitutional 
doubt to compel the Court to answer questions of statutory construc-
tion so as to avoid the potential constitutional conflict.  Separate con-
currences by Justices Stevens and Scalia in Jones went further, express-
ing not mere constitutional doubt, but confidence that the 
Constitution forbids legislatures to diminish the role of the jury in 
this manner.46  These concurring opinions laid the framework for the 
Court’s decision in Apprendi, where it would confront the constitu-
tional question directly.47  It is important, therefore, to understand 
Apprendi’s holding and, in particular, the prior conviction exception, 
against the backdrop of Jones and Almendarez-Torres. 
Indeed, in Apprendi, the Court explicitly adopted the formulation 
of the general rule as it was articulated in the Jones concurrences:  
“[i]t is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the 
assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to 
which a criminal defendant is exposed.”48  Additionally, the Court 
adopted the Jones majority’s position that Almendarez-Torres was limited 
to recidivism49 and that opinion’s explanation of why.50  The Court 
 
 45 See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 250 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(noting that the principle he believed controlled the case “requires merely a determina-
tion of serious constitutional doubt, and not a determination of unconstitutionality”). 
 46 See Jones, 526 U.S. at 252–53 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“I am convinced that it is unconsti-
tutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the 
prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed.”); id. at 253 (Sca-
lia, J., concurring) (“I set forth as my considered view, that it is unconstitutional to re-
move from the jury the assessment of facts that alter the congressionally prescribed range 
of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed.”). 
 47 See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (“With [the exception of the fact of prior 
conviction], we endorse the statement of the rule set forth in the concurring opinions in 
[Jones]:  ‘[I]t is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment 
of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is 
exposed.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 252–53 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring)). 
 48 Id. (quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 252–53 (Stevens, J., concurring)). 
 49 Id. at 488 (quoting language in Jones that states that both majority and dissent in Almenda-
rez-Torres agreed that the case’s holding was limited to recidivism). 
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reiterated the position that Almendarez-Torres was “at best an excep-
tional departure from the historic practice,”51 and then went on to 
explicitly treat the case as “a narrow exception to the general rule.”52  
Given the background of the prior conviction exception, it is clear 
that this narrow exception can be reconciled with the rationale of 
Apprendi only because the facts necessary to prove the prior convic-
tion in the first instance were presented to a jury which adjudged 
them true beyond a reasonable doubt.53 
This rationale produces an exception for prior convictions that 
can only be logically applied when the jury right has already attached 
at the prior trial.  Because no such right ever attaches in the case of 
juvenile adjudications, the rule is improperly circumvented when 
such an adjudication is used to increase a criminal sentence.  The re-
sult is that facts that have never been proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt to a jury increase a criminal sentence beyond the statutory 
maximum, bringing this practice squarely within the prohibition of 
Apprendi. 
In other words, using prior juvenile adjudications to impose 
greater punishment stretches the Almendarez-Torres exception to the 
Apprendi rule in a way that distorts the precedent and cannot, despite 




 50 Compare id. (“[T]he certainty that procedural safeguards attached to any ‘fact’ of prior 
conviction . . . mitigated the due process and Sixth Amendment concerns otherwise im-
plicated in allowing a judge to determine a ‘fact’ increasing punishment . . . .”) with Jones, 
526 U.S. at 249 (“[U]nlike virtually any other consideration used to enlarge the possible 
penalty for an offense . . . a prior conviction must itself have been established through 
procedures satisfying the . . . jury trial guarantee[].  Almendarez-Torres cannot, then, be 
read to resolve the due process and Sixth Amendment questions implicated by reading 
[the sentence-enhancing provisions at issue as sentencing factors as opposed to offense 
elements] . . . .”). 
 51 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 487. 
 52 Id. at 490. 
 53 More precisely, it is the opportunity of the accused to insist that all elements of the offense 
be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that allows the prior conviction exception 
to be squared with Apprendi’s rationale.  In reality, of course, offense elements are often 
admitted in a guilty plea or found true in a bench trial to which the accused has agreed.  
The Sixth Amendment does not, therefore, require that the right to a jury trial be exer-
cised.  It should be noted, however, that some of the most prominent scholarly criticism 
of Apprendi centers around the failure of that decision to recognize the prevalence of plea 
bargaining and the attendant diminution of the jury’s role in today’s criminal justice sys-
tem.  See Stephanos Bibas, How Apprendi Affects Institutional Allocations of Power, 87 IOWA 
L. REV. 465 (2002); Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a 
World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097 (2001). 
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II. THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF SENTENCE ELEVATIONS BASED 
ON JUVENILE NON-JURY ADJUDICATIONS 
As noted above, the majority of courts of appeals and state courts 
have taken approaches counter to the one proposed in this Com-
ment.54  This Part canvasses the main arguments made in favor of the 
majority position and lays out the typical response to each.  The fol-
lowing section examines each argument in light of the jury’s role in 
our constitutional structure beyond that of a mere guarantor of relia-
bility, a perspective that has largely been ignored by both sides of the 
debate. 
A. The Argument Based on the Satisfaction of All Applicable Due Process 
Requirements in the Juvenile Proceeding 
The most frequently adopted argument in support of sentence 
elevation based on juvenile non-jury adjudications is grounded in the 
fact that such adjudications are constitutionally valid despite the ab-
sence of a jury right.55  Essentially, the argument is that because the 
juvenile proceeding comported with all applicable due process re-
quirements, that decision falls within the prior conviction exception 
and is therefore a valid basis for a sentence enhancement.56 
This argument highlights the constitutional tension between Ap-
prendi and the case in which the Supreme Court held that the right to 
trial by jury does not extend to juvenile proceedings, McKeiver v. 
Pennsylvania.57  In McKeiver, the Court cited a long list of justifications 
for its decision.58  At its core, the decision rested on the Court’s ideal 
of a juvenile system that is not punitive and adversarial in nature,59 
 
 54 See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text. 
 55 See, e.g., People v. Nguyen, 209 P.3d 946, 949 (Cal. 2009) (“That authority [to increase a 
sentence on the basis of a defendant’s recidivism] may properly be exercised . . . when 
the recidivism is evidenced . . . by a constitutionally valid prior adjudication of criminal 
conduct.”). 
 56 See id. at 953 (“[W]e agree with the majority view that the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments, as construed in Apprendi, do not preclude the sentence-enhancing use, 
against an adult felon, of a prior valid, fair, and reliable adjudication that the defendant, 
while a minor, previously engaged in felony misconduct, where the juvenile proceeding 
included all the constitutional protections applicable to such matters, even though these 
protections do not include the right to jury trial.”). 
 57 See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (“[W]e conclude that trial by jury 
in the juvenile court’s adjudicative stage is not a constitutional requirement.”). 
 58 See id. at 545–50 (enumerating thirteen justifications for the court’s decision). 
 59 See id. at 545 (“[I]f required as a matter of constitutional precept, [the jury trial might] 
remake the juvenile proceeding into a fully adversary process and [might] put an effec-
tive end to what has been the idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal protective pro-
ceeding.”). 
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but rather serves a rehabilitative goal and positions the government 
in a protective relationship vis-à-vis the youth.60  In other words, the 
decision not to afford to juveniles the full procedural protection af-
forded to adults rests on a belief that juvenile proceedings are fun-
damentally different in their nature and purpose than criminal tri-
als.61 
When juvenile adjudications are used to elevate adult sentences, 
however, determinations made in a forum with weak due process pro-
tections are stripped from that context and used in a way that has se-
rious implications for the liberty of the defendant.  This practice rais-
es serious due process concerns and provides additional support for 
the view that sentence elevation on the basis of prior non-jury juve-
nile adjudications is constitutionally problematic.62 
Writing in dissent in the most recent case to address the use of ju-
venile adjudications as sentence enhancements in subsequent adult 
proceedings, Judge Posner observed: 
The constitutional protections to which juveniles have been held to 
be entitled have been designed with a different set of objectives in mind 
than just recidivist enhancement.  So the mere fact that a juvenile had all 
the process he was entitled to doesn’t make his juvenile conviction equiv-
alent, for purposes of recidivist enhancements, to adult convictions.63 
 
 60 See id. at 547 (“[W]e are particularly reluctant to say . . . that the system cannot accom-
plish its rehabilitative goals.”). 
 61 See generally Courtney P. Fain, Note, What’s in a Name?  The Worrisome Interchange of Juvenile 
“Adjudications” with Criminal “Convictions,” 49 B.C. L. REV. 495 (2008) (arguing that jury 
rights should not be extended to juvenile proceedings to legitimize their use in adult sen-
tencing, but rather that they should not be used in adult sentencing because of further 
differences between juvenile and adult criminal systems). 
 62 For a more detailed exposition of this problem, see Barry C. Feld, The Constitutional Ten-
sion Between Apprendi and McKeiver:  Sentence Enhancements Based on Delinquency Convic-
tions and the Quality of Justice in Juvenile Courts, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1111 (2003) (ar-
guing that “[t]he absence of a jury right detracts from the factual accuracy of delinquency 
convictions, adversely affects the quality of justice and delivery of legal services in juvenile 
courts, and raises significant questions about the propriety of using delinquency adjudica-
tions to enhance adult criminal sentences under the Apprendi exception for prior convic-
tions”).  See also Fain, supra note 62; Cart Rixey, Note, The Ultimate Disillusionment:  The 
Need for Jury Trials in Juvenile Adjudications, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 885, 887 (2009) (suggest-
ing “that the Kansas Supreme Court correctly held that the reasoning and public policy 
considerations of McKeiver v. Pennsylvania no longer apply because of the changing and 
increasingly punitive nature of juvenile codes”). 
 63 Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 431–32 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, J., dissenting).  The 
constitutionality under Apprendi of using juvenile non-jury adjudications as aggravating 
factors in subsequent adult sentencing proceedings had not been addressed in the Se-
venth Circuit before Welch v. United States.  Id. at 429.  The question was presented indi-
rectly through the defendant’s argument that his lawyer’s failure to raise the question at 
the sentencing proceeding constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.  Id. at 411.  The 
panel joined the majority of other circuits in holding that juvenile adjudications fall with-
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In short, the juvenile proceedings comport with a less strict due 
process requirement because they have a different purpose from 
adult courts.64  Fewer due process protections are required in juvenile 
courts because those courts do not sit to mete out punishment, but 
rather to find a way to rehabilitate young people.  When this deter-
mination is stripped from its context and used for an essentially puni-
tive purpose, however, the lower due process bar can no longer be 
justified by appeal to the parens patriae nature of the juvenile forum. 
Moreover, this argument strains the justification for the prior con-
viction exception65 by, in effect, substituting the predicate “constitu-
tional validity of the prior adjudication” for “availability of a jury trial 
in the previous conviction.”  It is easy to see that attachment of a jury 
right in a prior conviction might have some bearing on what the 
Sixth Amendment requires for use of that conviction as a sentence 
enhancement in a subsequent proceeding.  There is no such logical 
connection that explains why the Sixth Amendment’s requirement 
should be satisfied in a case where no jury right ever attached. 
B. The Argument Based on the Status of Recidivism as a “Highly 
Traditional” Basis for a Judge’s Decision to Enhance a Sentence 
In its most basic form, the argument that recidivism is traditionally 
part of a judge’s discretion at sentencing and, therefore, need not be 
proven to a jury is simply not responsive to the underlying question.  
Almendarez-Torres makes perfectly clear that sentence elevation based 
on prior convictions falls within a judge’s traditional discretion,66 but 
reiterating this fact does nothing to advance the inquiry into whether 
juvenile adjudications count as prior convictions for this purpose under 
Apprendi.  The nature and purpose of the juvenile justice system sup-
port the contention that juvenile adjudications are not “convictions” 
at all, but something else entirely.67   
 
in the prior conviction exception to Apprendi.  Id. at 426.  In his dissent, Posner goes on to 
point out that keying Apprendi’s scope and that of the prior conviction exception to the 
due process afforded in the prior tribunal seems to lead to an untenable result:  might 
not a conviction for a military crime by a military commission with very limited due 
process protections nonetheless be used to enhance a later ordinary criminal sentence?  
Id. at 432. 
 64 See Fain, supra note 62, at 518 (stating that rehabilitation is the goal of juvenile courts). 
 65 See supra Part I. 
 66 See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 243 (1998) (noting that recidivism 
is the most traditional basis on which a court may increase a criminal sentence). 
 67 See Fain, supra note 62, at 519 (“[J]uvenile court proceedings are considered non-criminal 
in nature . . . .”). 
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Moreover, it is something of a sleight of hand when the traditional 
“recidivism” factor is substituted for the fact of a prior juvenile adju-
dication.  The traditional rationales that justify allowing a judge to 
enhance a sentence on the basis of recidivism do not apply to juvenile 
adjudications.  Whether recidivism enhancements serve a crime pre-
vention purpose or a retributive purpose is open for debate.68  A defi-
nition of “recidivism” that includes juvenile adjudications seems at 
odds with either rationale.  With respect to the crime control ratio-
nale, it is not at all clear that juvenile crime has the predictive value 
of adult crime when it comes to future offenses.69  With respect to the 
retributivist rationale, criminal actions committed by children might 
not constitute the same reflection on moral character as crimes 
committed by adults.70  Moreover, research on community views sug-
gest that although people do consider a repeat offense somewhat 
more blameworthy than a first offense, the dramatic enhancement of 
sentences under most three-strikes or habitual offender statutes di-
verges sharply from shared intuitions of justice.71 
A more subtle form of this argument relies on Oregon v. Ice, which 
held that a state may constitutionally assign to a judge—rather than a 
jury—responsibility for finding facts necessary to support imposing 
sentences consecutively rather than concurrently.72  The Court held 
that this was the case because “[t]here is no encroachment here by 
the judge upon facts historically found by the jury.”73  The argument, 
as it applies here, is that because juvenile trials have traditionally 
been held in the absence of juries, there is no encroachment on the 
 
 68 Such provisions are most often justified on incapacitation grounds.  Proponents argue 
that a history of recidivism shows that the defendant cannot be deterred and therefore 
must be incarcerated to prevent the commission of future crimes.  See Paul H. Robinson 
et al., The Disutility of Injustice 8 (Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Re-
search Paper No. 09-24, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1470905 (describing 
the justifications commonly offered for habitual offender statutes).   
 69 See Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Essay, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799, 
820–21 (2003) (relying on the work of several psychiatric studies to conclude that much 
crime committed by youths is better understood as “experimentation in risky beha-
vior . . . [as] part of identity development” that, more often than not, “desists naturally as 
individuals develop a stable sense of self and maturity of judgment”). 
 70 See id. (arguing that “[t]he criminal choices of typical young offenders differ from those 
of adults . . . because the adolescent’s criminal act does not express the actor’s bad cha-
racter,” whereas most adults who commit crimes “act upon subjectively defined prefe-
rences and values”). 
 71 See Robinson et al., supra note 68, at 27, 29 (describing empirical research showing that 
“the crime-control doctrines most divergent from community views include . . . three-
strikes (habitual offender) doctrines”). 
 72 See Oregon v. Ice, 129 S. Ct. 711, 714–15 (2009). 
 73 Id. at 718. 
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historic role of the jury when a juvenile is adjudicated delinquent 
without a jury right and that adjudication is subsequently used to en-
hance an adult criminal sentence.  This version of the argument as-
serts that, like the fact of a prior conviction, juvenile delinquency is 
traditionally a determination for the judge, not the jury.  This argu-
ment fails because juveniles have received a wide range of treatment 
by courts throughout history.74  Ice’s historical inquiry is therefore 
simply not probative.  The varying treatment through time and 
among states makes it impossible to say what questions tradition re-
serves for judges as opposed to juries. 
C. The Technical Compliance Argument 
Some courts have embraced the view that, as long as the jury in 
the subsequent adult trial makes a determination as to the fact of the 
prior conviction, Apprendi is technically satisfied.  According to this 
argument, Apprendi requires only that the jury in the current case 
find beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a prior adjudication of 
guilt, and that it is not necessary that the actual facts supporting a 
guilty verdict ever be found by a jury.75  This is the intermediate ap-
proach adopted by the state of Oregon.76 
At best, this approach is formalistic.  At worst, it is an insulting cir-
cumvention of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the right to a 
jury trial.  Either way, the argument does not withstand scrutiny; it 
pays lip service to the Sixth Amendment and cannot be reconciled 
with Apprendi’s robust jury right.  As California Supreme Court Justice 
Kennard pointed out, such an argument “opens the door to whole-
sale evasion or trivialization of the holding in Apprendi.”77 
III. THE COMMON MISTAKE OF THE ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF 
THE MAJORITY POSITION:  OVERLOOKING THE INSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF 
THE JURY 
The previous Parts have surveyed the arguments in support of the 
majority position and the most common responses to them.  This 
 
 74 See State v. Rudy B., 216 P.3d 810, 818 (N.M. App. 2009) (summarizing the widely varied 
treatment of juveniles by courts). 
 75 See State v. Harris, 118 P.3d 236, 246 (Or. 2005) (holding that “the use of prior juvenile 
adjudications as sentencing factors in Oregon does not violate the jury trial right guaran-
teed by the Sixth Amendment . . . [but] when such an adjudication is offered as an en-
hancement . . . its existence must . . . be proved to a trier of fact”). 
 76 Id. 
 77 People v. Nguyen, 209 P.3d 946, 962 (Cal. 2009) (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
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Part suggests that a critical mischaracterization—or at least a mista-
ken emphasis—is common to all of the majority-position arguments.  
This mischaracterization obscures the way in which the majority posi-
tion erodes the jury right by undermining an important function of 
the jury within our constitutional structure.  That function, this 
Comment argues, is not merely to guarantee the accuracy of judicial 
proceedings but also to serve as a “bulwark between the State and the 
accused at the trial for an alleged offense.”78  The courts that have 
adopted the majority position err in their treatment of the right to a 
jury trial as only a check on accuracy, and not also a “fundamental 
reservation of power in our constitutional structure”79 as was intended 
by the Framers and is commanded by Apprendi.80 
A. The Right to a Jury Trial Was Designed to Reserve to the People Power over 
the Judiciary and to Protect Them from Tyranny of the Government 
Professor Akhil Amar proposes that “it is anachronistic to see jury 
trial as an issue of individual right rather than (also, and more fun-
damentally) a question of government structure.”81  Strong historical 
evidence supports the proposition that the Framers’ intent in passing 
the Sixth Amendment was to reserve to the people a democratic 
check on the power of the Judicial Branch.82  Indeed, Thomas Jeffer-
son, emphasizing the importance of the jury’s role as a check on the 
judiciary, indicated that it would be better that the people be left 
without a role in the Legislative Branch than that they be excluded 
from oversight of the judiciary.83 
Jefferson’s observation was not the only recognition of the jury’s 
role in a government by the people—it is only the most famous.  Pro-
fessor Laura Appleman has canvassed seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century sources and determined unequivocally that an Founding-era 
audience would have “understood the right to a jury trial to be a col-
lective right.”84  This historical observation contrasts sharply with to-
 
 78 See Ice, 129 S. Ct. at 717 (describing the animating principle of Apprendi). 
 79 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004). 
 80 See id. (referring to the jury right as a “fundamental reservation of power in our constitu-
tional structure” and asserting that “Apprendi carries out this design by ensuring that the 
judge’s authority to sentence derives wholly from the jury’s verdict”). 
 81 AMAR, supra note 4, at 104. 
 82 See Suja A. Thomas, Judicial Modesty and the Jury, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 767, 780 (2005) (dis-
cussing the Founders’ “recogni[tion of] the importance of the division of power between 
the judiciary and the jury”). 
 83 Id. (citing 3 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 82 (H.A. Washington ed., J.B. Lippin-
cott & Co. 1864)). 
 84 See Appleman, supra note 4, at 399. 
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day’s prevalent understanding of the jury as an individual right pos-
sessed by defendants and aimed at ensuring accuracy.  In the early 
nineteenth century, Tocqueville’s observations led him to place the 
jury right on par with the right to vote as an instrument of democratic 
rule:  “[t]he system of the jury, as it is understood in America, ap-
pears to me as direct and extreme a consequence of the dogma of the 
sovereignty of the people as universal suffrage.  These are two equally 
powerful means of making the majority reign.”85  He understood the 
jury as, first and foremost, a “political institution.”86 
In the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, the institutional under-
standing of the jury right is perhaps most clearly articulated in the 
opinions of Justice Scalia through the Apprendi line.  Beginning with 
Apprendi itself, Scalia lays out his view in response to Justice Breyer’s 
assertion that, in modern times, the jury cannot provide fairness.87  
Scalia chides Breyer, noting that his opinion “sketches an admirably 
fair and efficient scheme of criminal justice designed . . . to leave 
criminal justice to the State.”88  He goes on to note that “[t]he 
[F]ounders of the American Republic were not prepared to leave it 
to the State, which is why the jury-trial guarantee was one of the least 
controversial provisions of the Bill of Rights.”89  These quotations 
suggest that, in Scalia’s view, the jury right was the Founders’ way of 
checking the judicial power of the state. 
Scalia is even clearer in subsequent opinions.  Most importantly, 
in Blakely v. Washington, Scalia, this time writing for the majority, cha-
racterizes the jury right as “no mere procedural formality, but a fun-
damental reservation of power in our constitutional structure.”90  He 
goes on to argue, citing founding era documents including the diary 
of John Adams, that “[j]ust as suffrage ensures the people’s ultimate 
control in the legislative and executive branches, jury trial is meant to 
ensure their control in the judiciary.”91  In Ring v. Arizona, Justice Sca-
lia explicitly rejects characterization of the jury right as merely a 
guarantee of accuracy, noting that “[t]he Sixth Amendment jury trial 
right . . . does not turn on the relative rationality, fairness, or efficien-
cy of potential factfinders.”92 
 
 85 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 261 (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba 
Winthrop eds., trans., 2000) (1835). 
 86 Id. at 260 (“The jury is . . . before everything a political institution.”). 
 87 See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 555 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 88 Id. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 89 Id. 
 90 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004). 
 91 Id. 
 92 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 607 (2002). 
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A view of the jury as more than a guarantor of accuracy is reflect-
ed beyond Scalia’s opinions in the Apprendi line.  The Apprendi major-
ity, quoting an early constitutional authority, recognizes that the his-
torical function of the jury is “[t]o guard against a spirit of oppression 
and tyranny on the part of rulers” and to serve “as the great bulwark 
of [our] civil and political liberties.”93  Jones, the clear forerunner of 
the Apprendi line, also undertakes an extensive examination of the 
history of the Sixth Amendment and reaches the same conclusion.94 
Additionally, the Court’s holding that Ring v. Arizona does not ap-
ply retroactively provides further support for the notion that the 
Sixth Amendment as interpreted by Apprendi is not concerned pri-
marily with accuracy.95  The retroactivity inquiry centers on the risk of 
inaccurately convicting a person for conduct the law does not prohi-
bit, or, in death penalty cases, erroneously reaching the conclusion 
that the law allows the sentence of death.96  The majority opinion, 
written by Justice Scalia, dismisses the assertion that judicial fact-
finding seriously diminishes accuracy,97 suggesting that accurate fact- 
finding is not what underpins Ring and the rest of the Apprendi line.  
The four Justices in dissent argue that accuracy concerns do warrant 
retroactive application of Ring’s rule.  Yet the accuracy they have in 
mind is not accurate fact-finding, but rather accurate reflection of 
community values.98 
B. When Viewed Through the Lens of the Jury’s Institutional Role, the 
Arguments in Support of the Majority Position Fail 
Having explained the importance of understanding the Sixth 
Amendment not only as a protection of the rights of an individual de-
fendant but also as an institutional check on government power, I 
 
 93 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477 (alteration in original) (quoting J. STORY, 2 COMMENTARIES ON 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 540–41 (4th ed. 1873)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 94 See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 245–49 (1999) (citing early authorities such as 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES (1769) in support of the proposition that the jury 
right was perceived at the time of the founding as a check on the power of the state). 
 95 See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 358 (2004) (rejecting respondent’s argument that 
Ring articulated a watershed rule that must be applied retroactively). 
 96 See id. at 355; id. at 359 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 97 Id. at 356 (majority opinion) (“When so many presumably reasonable minds continue to 
disagree over whether juries are better factfinders at all, we cannot confidently say that 
judicial factfinding seriously diminishes accuracy.”) 
 98 Id. at 361 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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now turn to an application of this perspective to the arguments in fa-
vor of the majority position.99 
The argument based on the satisfaction of all constitutionally 
mandated due process requirements in the juvenile proceeding100 
perhaps most clearly reflects a mistaken emphasis on reliability.  The 
pivotal role that reliability plays in this argument is evident, for ex-
ample, in United States v. Matthews, in which the First Circuit adopted 
the majority rule: 
Thus, while their outcomes differed, all of the courts to consider the 
issue have agreed that “the question of whether juvenile adjudications 
should be exempt from Apprendi’s general rule should [ ] turn on . . . an 
examination of whether juvenile adjudications, like adult convictions, are 
so reliable that due process of law is not offended by such an exemp-
tion.”101 
If the only purpose of the jury right were to protect the defendant 
by ensuring reliability, then the fact that juvenile non-jury adjudica-
tions satisfy all applicable due process requirements might justify 
treating them like adult convictions for Apprendi purposes.  After all, 
the argument goes, the Supreme Court’s holding that juries are not 
required in juvenile courts suggests that juvenile adjudications are at 
least accurate enough.  But once it is recognized that the “jury trial 
right . . . does not turn on the relative rationality, fairness, or efficien-
cy of potential factfinders”102 but instead on a fundamental reserva-
tion to the people of control over the judiciary, an additional weak-
ness in this argument is revealed.   
The untenability of the Oregon approach103 is also exposed once 
the jury right is understood as a fundamental reservation of power to 
the people over the judiciary.  Viewed through this lens, the practice 
of allowing sentences to be elevated on the basis of non-jury adjudica-
tions of guilt can be seen for what it is:  an illicit transfer of power 
from jury to judge and an erosion of the jury right.  Allowing a judge 
to take notice of a prior conviction tried before a jury, as does the 
prior conviction exception, does not transfer power from jury to 
 
 99 See supra Part II. 
100 That is, the use of a juvenile non-jury adjudication to elevate a subsequent adult sentence 
does not violate Apprendi so long as the adjudication comported with all constitutionally 
mandated due process requirements.  See discussion supra Part II.A. 
101 United States v. Matthews, 498 F.3d 25, 35 (1st Cir. 2007) (alteration in original) (quoting 
United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, 1032–33 (8th Cir. 2002)). 
102 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 536, 607 (2002). 
103 Oregon has adopted the position that Apprendi’s requirement is satisfied if a jury in the 
adult case finds that there was a previous conviction, even if that previous “conviction” 
was a juvenile adjudication at which no jury right attached.  See State v. Harris, 118 P.3d 
236, 238–46 (Or. 2005); see also discussion supra Part II.C. 
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judge; rather, it transfers power from one jury to another:  from the 
jury in the present trial to the jury in the original trial.  When, on the 
other hand, jury determination of the fact of a prior conviction is al-
lowed to stand in for jury determination of the facts that support the 
prior conviction, power is transferred to the judge in the juvenile 
proceeding, and the jury right is rendered meaningless.  Because in 
such a scenario “the length of a sentence is made to depend upon 
facts removed from [the jury’s] determination,”104 the jury’s role is 
impermissibly diminished in a way that is contrary to “the system en-
visioned by a Constitution that guarantees trial by jury.”105 
The argument that non-jury juvenile adjudications are convictions 
for Apprendi purposes because recidivism is a highly traditional basis 
on which a judge may increase a sentence106 reflects the same one-
sided understanding of the jury right.  When approached with the 
jury’s role as a mechanism of popular sovereignty in mind, this tradi-
tion-based argument is persuasive only when the assigning the de-
termination in question to a judge does not allow the judiciary to mi-
sappropriate power that traditionally belongs to the people.  
Otherwise, the role of the jury is unacceptably diminished.  When a 
judge bases a recidivism enhancement on a juvenile adjudication, 
however, she unquestionably takes from the jury the right to deter-
mine questions tradtionally within their province—the facts support-
ing an adjudication of guilt. 
 
 
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM WITH 
USING PRIOR JUVENILE NON-JURY ADJUDICATIONS AS SENTENCE 
ENHANCEMENTS FOR CRIMES COMMITTED AS AN ADULT 
If the use of prior juvenile non-jury adjudications to enhance 
adult sentences is a violation of the constitutional right to a jury trial, 
as this Comment has argued, this problem could be resolved by the 
Supreme Court in one of three ways.107  One option would be for the 
 
104 Oregon v. Ice, 129 S. Ct. 711, 721 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
105 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 498 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
106 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
107 The Court has rejected numerous petitions for certiorari in cases that squarely presented 
this issue; among those cases are decisions that have reached opposite results.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Matthews, 498 F.3d 25, 35 (1st Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1238 
(2008); United States v. Crowell, 493 F.3d 744, 750 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that the use 
of procedurally sound juvenile adjudications to enhance adult sentences does not violate 
due process), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1105 (2008); United States v. Burge, 407 F.3d 1183 
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Supreme Court to overrule Almendarez-Torres and hold that prior con-
victions are not exempted from the general principle laid out in Ap-
prendi.  A second possibility would be to hold that juveniles have a 
constitutional right to a trial by jury, overruling McKeiver.  Juvenile ad-
judications going forward would therefore include a jury right and 
would fall within the Almendarez-Torres prior conviction exception.  
Finally, the Court could simply hold that a non-jury juvenile convic-
tion does not fall within the prior conviction exception to Apprendi.  
Each of these possibilities will be addressed in turn. 
A. Overruling Almendarez-Torres 
Because the continued viability of Almendarez-Torres has been in 
question almost since it was handed down,108 perhaps the most ob-
vious solution would be to overrule that case, which is limited to the 
fact of recidivism alone,109 and update the Apprendi rule to reflect the 
lack of a prior conviction exception.  The characterization of Almen-
darez-Torres as “an exceptional departure from . . . historic practice”110 
that was “arguabl[y] . . . incorrectly decided,”111 coupled with the fact 
that it was a five-four decision about which a fifth justice has subse-
 
(11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 981 (2005); United States v. Jones, 332 F.3d 688 (3d 
Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1150 (2004); United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030 (8th 
Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1114 (2003); People v. Nguyen, 209 P.3d 946 (Cal. 2009), 
cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 2091 (2010); Ryle v. State, 842 N.E.2d 320 (Ind. 2005), cert. denied, 
549 U.S. 836 (2006); State v. Hitt, 42 P.3d 732 (Kan. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1104 
(2003); State v. Brown, 879 So. 2d 1276, 1290 (La. 2004) (finding the use of juvenile ad-
judications to increase a defendant’s penalty as unconstitutional), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 
1177 (2005); State v. Weber, 149 P.3d 646 (Wash. 2006), cert. denied, 551 U.S. 1137 
(2007).  Nevertheless, the Court is certain to continue to receive petitions presenting this 
issue.  Indeed, at least one petition raising this issue was pending when this Comment 
went to print.  See Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408 (7th Cir. 2010), petition for cert. 
filed, 79 U.S.L.W. 3129 (U.S. Sept. 1, 2010) (10-314).  In Welch, the Seventh Circuit ad-
dressed for the first time the question of whether juvenile adjudications could be used to 
elevate adult sentences and concluded that “because juvenile adjudications are reliable, 
they are not subject to the Apprendi rule.”  Id. at 429.  Judge Posner dissented, interpret-
ing Apprendi to require that a prior conviction used as a sentence elevating factor “must 
be the outcome of a proceeding in which the defendant had a right to have a jury deter-
mine his guilt.”  Id. at 431 (Posner, J., dissenting).   
108 See James G. Levine, Note, The Armed Career Criminal Act and the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines:  
Moving Toward Consistency, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 537, 554 (2009) (observing that in addi-
tion to the four dissenting justices in Almendarez-Torres, Justice Thomas, who sided with 
the majority, has also expressed the view that the case might have been wrongly decided). 
109 See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488 (noting the general agreement that the holding of Almenda-
rez-Torres was limited to recidivism). 
110 Id. at 487. 
111 Id. at 489. 
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quently expressed reservations,112 suggest that this is a plausible sce-
nario.  However, the recent decision in Ice, which enshrined into the 
Apprendi jurisprudence the importance of the traditional classifica-
tion of a fact as a sentencing factor,113 might have changed this calcu-
lus somewhat because of its implicit endorsement of the logic under-
pinning Almendarez-Torres. 
Perhaps more importantly, overruling Almendarez-Torres would 
close the prior conviction exception not only to juvenile non-jury ad-
judications, but also to prior adult convictions that were decided by 
juries.  It is therefore an overbroad solution to the problem discussed 
in this Comment.  It seems unlikely that the Supreme Court would 
resolve the constitutional problem associated with sentence en-
hancement based on juvenile priors by overruling a precedent that, 
as it applies to adult convictions, does not raise any constitutional 
concerns.   
B. Overruling McKeiver  
The Supreme Court could remedy the constitutional obstacle to 
use of juvenile priors by doing away with non-jury juvenile adjudica-
tions altogether.  This could, of course, be accomplished by state leg-
islatures.  Indeed, some states have provided such a right in limited 
circumstances, but even in those states the vast majority of juvenile 
adjudications are not decided by juries.114  At least one state supreme 
court has held that juveniles do have a state constitutional right to a 
jury trial.115 
Eliminating the problem nationally, however, would require the 
U.S. Supreme Court to explicitly overrule McKeiver.  Some critics of 
the juvenile justice system have argued that the Court should do just 
that.116  The argument for doing so is essentially that the rationale 
 
112 See id. at 499–523 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
113 See Oregon v. Ice, 129 S. Ct. 711, 717 (2009) (finding historical practice adequate to justi-
fy leaving consideration of facts relevant to the decision to impose multiple sentences 
consecutively or concurrently to the judge rather than the jury). 
114 See Sandra M. Ko, Comment, Why Do They Continue to Get the Worst of Both Worlds?  The Case 
for Providing Louisiana’s Juveniles with the Right to a Jury in Delinquency Adjudications, 12 AM. 
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 161, 177–78 n.118 (2004) (stating that between 1% and 3% 
of juvenile adjudications are decided by juries in states where juveniles have the right to a 
jury trial). 
115 See In re L.M., 186 P.3d 164, 171–72 (Kan. 2008) (holding that juveniles have a right to a 
jury trial under the Kansas Constitution). 
116 See Feld, supra note 63, at 1111 (arguing that McKeiver should be overruled); see also Rixey, 
supra note 63, at 887 (arguing that the reasoning of McKeiver has been undermined by 
changes in the juvenile system). 
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underpinning the McKeiver decision is no longer applicable.117  In 
other words, because juvenile codes have become increasingly puni-
tive and less rehabilitative, the absence of a jury guarantee can no 
longer be justified, as it was in McKeiver, by appealing to the parens pa-
triae role of the state in juvenile proceedings.118  One scholar has even 
gone so far as to argue that Apprendi should provide additional moti-
vation to the Court to overrule McKeiver so that juvenile adjudications 
could be used to enhance adult sentences without raising constitu-
tional doubts.119 
Essentially, then, the decision between this solution and the over-
ruling of Almendarez-Torres boils down to the question of whether it is 
more desirable to overhaul the juvenile justice system by providing a 
constitutional jury right to avoid the tension with Apprendi, or to close 
the prior conviction exception in Apprendi to bring that case’s rule in 
line with the reality of the juvenile justice system.  The policy consid-
erations in favor of the former are compelling,120 but the constitu-
tional argument does not appear to have gained much traction within 
the court.  Moreover, this possibility seems less likely than the latter, 
as the Court has not expressed the same doubts about McKeiver as it 
has about the continued viability of the Almendarez-Torres precedent.121 
At any rate, speculation regarding the relative likelihood that the 
Court will overrule one of the two aforementioned precedents ulti-
mately does not provide guidance as to what the Court should do.  As 
a solution to the constitutional problem with which this Comment is 
concerned, this solution, like the possibility of overruling Almendarez-
Torres, is overbroad.  Overruling McKeiver would provide a new jury 
right to juveniles even where the constitutional problem with which 
this Comment is concerned does not arise, depriving states of the 
flexibility that the Court has deemed necessary to a distinct informal 
 
117 See Rixey, supra note 63, at 887. 
118 See id. (“[T]he reasoning and public policy considerations of McKeiver v. Pennsylvania no 
longer apply because of the changing and increasingly punitive nature of juvenile 
codes.”). 
119 See Feld, supra note 63, at 1111–12 (“McKeiver long has been ripe for overruling on its own 
merits, and Apprendi provides additional impetus for the Supreme Court and states to 
grant juveniles a constitutional or statutory right to a jury trial so that criminal courts 
properly may use delinquency adjudications as a legitimate ‘fact of a prior conviction.’”). 
120 See generally Feld, supra note 63 (arguing that the constitutional tension between Apprendi 
and McKeiver should be resolved by overruling McKeiver and requiring jury trials in juve-
nile courts); Rixey, supra note 63 (advocating the overruling of McKeiver because the poli-
cy considerations underpinning it are no longer applicable).   
121 See discussion supra Part I.A. 
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and rehabilitation-oriented juvenile justice system.122  While there is 
good reason to believe this would be a change for the better, such a 
broad solution is not called for by the narrow constitutional problem 
in question. 
C. A Juvenile Adjudication Is Not a Conviction Within the Meaning of the 
Almendarez-Torres Exception to Apprendi 
The solution most compatible with Supreme Court precedent 
would be to hold that a non-jury juvenile adjudication is not a prior 
conviction for Apprendi purposes.  In other words, rather than chang-
ing the Apprendi rule or upending the juvenile justice system, the 
Court could simply answer in the negative the central question ad-
dressed in this Comment, which currently divides the circuits and 
state courts.  The Court could simply hold that a non-jury adjudica-
tion is not a prior conviction for purposes of the exception to Appren-
di. 
Allowing judges alone to elevate sentences substantially erodes the 
jury right and undermines the reservation of power to the people 
that the framers sought to effectuate by guaranteeing the right to a 
jury trial.  It does so in a way that Almendarez-Torres does not because, 
unlike in the case of a previous adult conviction, no jury has ever 
found the ultimate facts necessary to find the defendant guilty.  Sig-
nificantly, this position is also consistent with the McKeiver rationale 
regarding the differences between adult and juvenile criminal pro-
ceedings.  Because this solution does not require overruling any past 
precedents, it seems the most plausible.  Moreover, it resolves the 
narrow constitutional problem with elevating sentences based on 
prior juvenile adjudications with no collateral effects for other par-
ties.  Finally, it effectively reconciles the Apprendi rule with the con-
cern that truly underpins the Sixth Amendment Jury Guarantee.  For 
these reasons, the Supreme Court should grant certiorari in an ap-
propriate case123 and hold explicitly, as have the Ninth Circuit and the 
Louisiana Supreme Court, that prior juvenile non-jury adjudications 
are not prior convictions within the meaning of Apprendi and there-
fore may not constitutionally be used to enhance sentences in later 
adult criminal proceedings.   
 
122 See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 551 (1971) (“If the formalities of the criminal 
adjudicative process are to be superimposed upon the juvenile court system, there is little 
need for its separate existence.  Perhaps that ultimate disillusionment will come one day, 
but for the moment we are disinclined to give impetus to it.”). 
123 The Court receives petitions for certiorari in such cases regularly.  See supra note 108. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This Comment has sought to address the constitutional problem 
under Apprendi and its progeny that arises when a prior non-jury ju-
venile adjudication is used to enhance an adult defendant’s sentence 
for a subsequent crime.  My aim was to examine this question in light 
of an understanding of the Sixth Amendment jury guarantee as not 
only an individual right aimed at assuring accuracy, but also a com-
munity right designed to limit the power of the state. 
To be clear, my intent has not been to diminish the importance of 
the jury right’s role in ensuring accurate fact-finding and protecting 
individual defendants.  Rather, I have sought to draw attention to the 
other important aspect of the right to a jury trial, and to examine 
what a more complete understanding of the Sixth Amendment’s jury 
guarantee suggests about the unresolved question of juvenile adjudi-
cations as elevating factors in subsequent adult sentencing.  An ex-
amination of the arguments favoring the majority position reveals 
that they fail to account for the jury’s structural role.  In light of this 
determination, this Comment proposes that the Supreme Court hold 
explicitly that juvenile non-jury adjudications may not later be used to 
increase the sentence of an adult defendant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
